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JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE "SUNK 
COSTS" STRATEGY OF GOVERNMENT 
AGENCIES 
DAVID E. COLE* 
Abstract: v\Then a government agency. during the construction of a 
public works project, has violated a statute, a court may be hesitant to 
issue an injunction because of the potential "waste" of public funds that 
haye already been spent. Knowing this, agencies may engage in a "sunk 
costs" strategy while a decision on enjoining the project is looming-
continuing to invest money in the project, often at an increased rate, in 
order to gain adyantage in the equitable balancing used to evaluate the 
necessity for an injunction. An increase in the amount of irrecoverable 
public funds itlYested in furtherance of a statutory violation may tilt the 
judge's balancing in the agency's favor. This Note addresses this sunk 
costs strategy and concludes that, in light of traditional equitable 
jurisprudence, the money spent by an agency to take advantage of this 
balancing cannot be included itl the balancitlg process. 
Thus, in the midst of the 1Ilud and at the heart of the fog, sits the Lord 
High Chancellor ill his High COllrt of Chancery.! 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1933, Congress created the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 
to further national defense and agricultural and industrial develop-
ment by "improv[ing] navigation in the Tennessee River" and "con-
trol[ling] the destructive floodwaters in the Tennessee River and Mis-
sissippi River Basins. "2 To fulfill its mission, the TVA started building a 
network of dams throughout the Tennessee Valley river system.3 One 
of the last of these dams, a small non-power project, which the TVA 
* Editor-in-Chief, BOS'IUN COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2002-03. I 
would like to thank Professor Zygmunt Plater, Benjamin Krass, Jo Lown, and Anne Rajotte 
for all of their suggestions and their patience during the production of this Note. 
1 CHARLES DICKENS. BLEAK HOUSE 21 (Penguin Books 1980) (1853). 
2 Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. § 831 (2000). 
3 ZygmuntJ.B. Plater, In thc Wakc ofthc Snail Dartcr: An Ellvirol/l/Icntal Law Paradigm and 
its Consequcnces, 19 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 805, 807-08 (1986). 
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proposed for regional development,4 came to national attention in 
1978 in the case of TVA v. Hill,5 as the agency was fighting its way 
through one of a series of lawsuits aimed at blocking the completion 
of the project.6 
As proposed, the Tellico Dam project would have far reaching 
social, economic, and ecological effects: the dam was to be built on 
the Cherokees' most sacred religious site, the city of Chota; further-
more, the 1VA would need to condemn hundreds of families' genera-
tional farmland. 7 Local opposition soon arose consisting of: the family 
farmers; the Eastern Band of Cherokees; biologists, who regarded the 
region as an important natural habitat for species; archeologists and 
historians, who wanted to protect the area's cultural and historical 
significance; and sportsmen, who were concerned about the effects of 
the dam on fishing and hunting.8 
As a successful suit under the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) halted work on the dam, forcing the 1VA to prepare an envi-
ronmental impact statement for the Tellico Dam project,9 the 
4 The project required the acquisition of the generational property of hundreds of 
families. Id. TVA agents reminded those who refused to sell their land of TVA's statutorily 
granted eminent domain power. One agent threatened, "We've got our own cOllrt and our 
own judge." WILLIAM U. CHANDLER, THE MYTH OF TVA: CONSERVATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT IN THE TENNESSEE VALLEY, 1933-1983, at 162 (1984); see 16 U.S.c. § 831q. This con-
demned acreage included land that would remain unsubmerged, which would be given to 
the Boeing Corporation to build a modern industrial city, named Timberlake, requiring 
additional federal funding. Sec STEPHEN J. RECHICHAR & MICHAEL R. FITZea:RALD, THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION: TVA's ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MISSION 
AND INTRA GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION 42-43 (1983). In early 1975, Boeing withdrew 
from the Tellico Dam project partly because of the increasingly grim prospects of obtain-
ing this additional federal funding. Sec id. 
5437 U.S. 153 (1978) [Hill III]. 
6 There were three major lawsuits and various appeals. Sequoyah v. TVA, 480 
F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980); Hill v. TVA, 419 
F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) [HitlI], rev'd, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 
153 (1978); Envtl. Def. Fund v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1164 
(6th Cir. 1972). 
7 See CHANDLER, supra note 4, at 164; Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Rcjlected in a River: Agency Ac-
countability and tlte Tv.1 Tellico Dam Case, 49 TENN. L. REV. 747, 756 (1982). The Cherokee 
had inhabited Georgia until 1838 when soldiers, under the command of General Winfred 
Scott, concentrated them into prison camps, and then started them on a winter march 
westward to Indian Territory, or what is now the State of Oklahoma. DEE BROWN, BURY My 
HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE: AN INDIAN HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST 7 (1970). This 
march, known as the "Trail of Tears," claimed a quarter of the Cherokee's lives by cold, 
starvation, or disease. Id. A few hundred had escaped the march and sought refuge in the 
Smoky Mountains. Id. 
8 Sec Plater, supra note 7, at 756 & n.27. 
9 Ellvtl. Dcf. Fund, 339 F. Supp. at 812. 
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conflicting values of the local community and the agency became evi-
dent. IO On August 12, 1973. Dr. David Etnier, an ichthyologist from 
the University of Tennessee, discovered the snail darter, a small. 
threatened fish near the project site)1 Knowing that strong legislation 
was about to be passed by Congress regarding the protection of en-
dangered species, Etnier commented, "[T] his is the fish that will stop 
Tellico Dam. "12 
In December of 1973, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) was en-
acted, mandating that 
[e]ach Federal agency shall. in consultation with and with 
the assistance of the Secretary [of the Interior], insure that 
any action authorized, funded. or carried out by such agency 
... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any 
endangered species or threatened species or result in the 
destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such spe-
cies which is determined ... to be critical.13 
The passage of the ESA breathed new life into the dam's local opposi-
tion, who found that the newly discovered. endangered, three-inch 
fish now had the potential to block the Tellico Dam project.14 In 1974, 
a citizens group requested that the 1VA comply with the new federal 
law)5 The 1VA insisted that the ESA did not apply to the Tellico Dam 
project, and stated that "no court had ordered the agency to halt con-
struction" yet.16 
The citizens group petitioned the Department of the Interior to 
list the snail darter as endangered and designate its critical habitat as 
the waters near the Tellico Dam project,l7 The 1VA actively resisted 
both of these efforts; these two procedural requirements would allow 
10 Scc RECHICHAR & FITZGERALD, supra note 4, at 39. 
11 Id. Ironically, Dr. Etnier was working under contract with the 'IVA at the time to 
study the environmental impacts that the Tellico Dam would have on the river in accor-
dance with 'IVA's NEPA obligations. CHANDLER, supra note 4, at 163. 
12 Sec RECHICHAR & FITZGERALD, supra note 4, at 39. 
13 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) (2000). 
14 Scc id.; EndallgcTcd Spccics OvCTSigltt: Hcaring Before thc S. C01lt1lt. on tltc Env't & Public 
llvTks, 95th Congo 877 (1977) (written statement of Hiram G. Hill, Jr., Member, Tenn. En-
dangered Species Comm.) [hereinafter OvCTSight HcaTillgs]. 
15 Scc OvcTsigltt Hcarings. supra note 14, at 877 (written statement of Hiram G. Hill, Jr., 
Member, Tenn. Endangered Species Comm.). 
16 Scc id. 
17 Hill!, 419 F. Supp. 753, 756 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), 
a/f'd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
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the citizens group to invoke the ESA's protection for the fish. 18 The 
most obvious objectives of the 1VA's efforts failed: the snail darter was 
eventually listed as endangered,19 its critical habitat was designated 
near the Tellico Dam project,20 and plaintiffs were able to file suit 
seeking an injunction to halt the completion of the dam.21 With all of 
its efforts, the 1VA achieved a less obvious objective-delay.22 As one 
of the plaintiffs in the Hill litigation observed: 
The effect of 1VA's voluminous submissions, complaints, 
and objections, often filed at the end of the official com-
ment periods ... was to prolong the administrative process 
un til November 1975 for the species listing and the [critical] 
habitat listing until April 1976. Even then the agency argued 
that the [Department of the] Interior actions were not effec-
tive until 30 days after publication.23 
The importance of this delay to the 1VA manifested itself in a dra-
matic change in atmosphere and a new sense of urgency at the Tellico 
Dam construction site as this drama of the snail darter unfolded. 24 
The 1VA continued dam construction, despite the opinion of the Di-
rector of the Fish and Wildlife Service that "[t]he proposed im-
poundment of water behind the proposed Tellico Dam would result 
in total destruction of the snail darter's habitat,"25 and despite the 
citizen group's subsequent notification to the 1VA that further work 
on the Tellico Dam project would violate the ESA. 26 Also, the pace of 
the dam's construction dramatically increased.27 In the seven years 
18 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533, 1536(a) (1); Hill 1, 419 F. Supp. at 756; Oversight Hearings, supra 
note 14, at 877 (written statement of Hiram G. Hill, Jr., Member, Tenn. Endangered Spe· 
cies Comm.). 
Ig See Hill I, 419 F. Supp. at 756. This listing occurred on November 10, 1975, ten 
months after the citizens group first urged the Department of the Interior to do so. Id. 
20 Id. This designation occurred in April of 1976 to become effective on May 3, 1976. 
Id. 
21 A citizens group, along with Zygmunt Plater, a professor of law at the University of 
Tennessee, and Hiram Hill, a law student at the Unh'ersity of Tennessee, filed the lawsuit 
in February of 1976. See id. at 756. Hill had written a term paper on the Endangered Spe-
cies Act for Plater that "was the genesis of the Tellico Dam snail darter lawsuit." Plater, 
snpm note 7, at 756 n.28. 
22 See Plater, supra note 7, at 768 n.72. 
23 See Oversight Hemings, supra note 14, at 877 (written statement of Hiram G. Hill, Jr., 
Member, Tenn. Endangered Species Comm.). 
24 See Plater, supra note 7, at 768. 
25 See Hill 1, 419 F. Supp. at 756 (quoting 40 Fed. Reg. 47,506 (Nov. 10, 1975)). 
26Id. 
27Id. at 760; Plater, supra note 7, at 768. 
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preceding Dr. Etnier's discovery, the TVA had expended $35 million 
on the project.28 During the four years following this discovery, the 
TVA increased the rate of its investment in the project, spending an 
additional $67 million in that period.29 
After a suit was brought to enjoin construction of the dam and its 
related earthworks, the district court refused to issue an injunction, 
despite finding that it was "highly probable" that the completion of 
the dam would 'Jeopardize the continued existence of the snail 
darter. "30 When the plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit, the TVA 
adopted a three-shift-a-day, six-day-a-week construction schedule, with 
crews working under floodlights through the night for several 
months.31 A statement overheard in a TVA meeting perfectly summa-
rized the strategy that the TVA was employing, while the plaintiffs 
awaited review of the district court's decision: "By the time Plater [the 
plain tiffs' attorney] stands up to argue ... there won't be a tree stand-
ing in the reservoir area. "32 
TVA's strategy can be considered a "sunk costs" strategy, a breed 
of a fait accompli tactic. 33 A fait accompli strategy involves mooting an 
issue so that the merits of an action are never addressed.34 Had the 
TVA rushed the Tellico Dam to completion before the snail darter 
could be officially listed as endangered and its critical habitat could 
be designated-or before an injunction to halt construction could be 
issued-a court would likely determine the issue to be moot.35 
Seeking a similar result, those using a sunk costs strategy seek to 
taint a court's views toward its remedial powers. In the case of Tellico 
Dam, partial completion of the dam did this quite effectively, even as 
the courts were addressing a statutory violation. Such a strategy places 
28 Hill!, 419 F. Supp. at 760; Plater, supra note 7, at 768. 
29 See Plater, supra note 7, at 768. 
30 Hill!, 419 F. Supp. at 757. 
31 See Oversight Hearings, Sltpra note 14, at 875 (written statement of Hiram G. Hill, Jr., 
Member, Tenn. Endangered Species Comm.); Plater, supra note 7, at 768. 
32 See Plater, Sllpra note 7, at 768 n.72. 
33 Scc Jeffrey S. Kopf, Comment, Steammlling Section 7(d) of the Endangered Species Act; 
How SUlik Costs Undermine Environmcntal Regulation, 23 B.C. ENVTL. An. L. REV. 393, 393 
(1996); scc also JOSEPH L. SAX, DEfENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN 
AC'110N 102 (1971). 
34 SCCSAX, supra note 33, at 102. 
35 See Oversight Hea/jngs, supra note 14, at 877 (written statement of Hiram G. Hill, Jr., 
Member, Tenn. Endangered Species Comm.); SAX, supra note 33, at 102. But sec TVA y. 
Hill, 549 F.2d 1064, 1071 (6th Cir. 1977) [Hill II] (stating that "[clonscientiollS enforce-
ment of the Act requires that it be taken to its logical extreme"-halting the impoundment 
of water behind a completed dam), aff'd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
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the court in the precarious position of issuing an injunction to stop a 
costly, nearly completed, federal works project.36 Defendants using a 
sunk costs strategy depend on the money spent in violation of a stat-
ute or the common law to skew the court's equitable calculus, called 
the "balancing of the utilities," in the defendant's favor as the court 
determines the appropriateness of an injunction.37 
This sunk costs strategy was not new at the time of Hill, and it can 
be a particularly destructive strategy, undermining environmental 
statutes and regulations.38 Public agencies find value in this strategy 
where "much time, effort, and money h[ave] already been invested in 
a proposal. ... [P] ublic agencies ... argue-when challenged-that 
huge sums of money have already been invested and that public op-
position ... comes too late. "39 By the time a judge can decide whether 
36 See SAX, supra note 33, at 102-04; infra Part N. The district court grappled with this 
problem, stating, "In excess of $78 million in public funds have been inYested in the proj-
ect, and if it were permanently enjoined, lVA estimates that some $53 million would be 
lost in nonrecoverable obligations." Hill L 419 F. Supp. 753,759 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd, 
549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), afj'd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). The Sixth Circuit, on the appeal 
of this denial and uncomfortable with the position in which it found itself, wrote: "We are 
... asked to balance the survival of a living species against the completion of a public 
works project which is more than 80% completed and represents a federal illYestment of 
almost ninety million dollars." Hill IL 549 F.2d at 1067. Later, in the same opinion, the 
circuit court again stressed the awkwardness of its position: "[Tl his legal controversy may 
well enjoy a modicum of notoriety because it appears to pit the survival of an obscure fish 
against completion of a $100 million reservoir .... " Id. at 1069. 
37 See SAX, supra note 33, at 102. 
38 See id. 
39 See id. at 102-03. A related tactic was used in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe. 
That case concerned the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968,23 U.S.C. § 138, which prohib-
ited any program or project that required the use of publicly owned land from a public 
park. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 405 (1971). It provided an 
exception where there was no feasible or prudent alternative, which required the Secre-
tary of Transportation's approval. Id. The Bureau of Public Roads and the Federal High-
way Administrator approved of a plan to have Interstate 1-40 go through the center of a 
park in Memphis, Tennessee. Id. at 406-07. The Act prohibited this, but instead of using a 
statute as a general guideline for its actions, the agency tailored its policies and actions 
towards obtaining an exception to a statute. Id. at 407-08. The government agency con-
demned land and built a highway up to the north and south edges of a public park. Id. 
This made the other alternatives (those which did not require going through the park) 
allegedly unfeasible and imprudent due to financial constraints that were created by the 
agency. Id. at 408-09. This fait accompli tactic was not briefed, but during oral argument 
the plaintiffs' counsel noted: 
[Ilf the Secretary is to be allowed to thwart any review of his decisions by this 
piecemeal acquisition of right of way right up to the park, then the admini-
stration, the effectiveness of this statute is whittled away ... Because, every 
time he has a controversial project it would be possible to box himself in, and 
to box the Court in and to present you with a fait accompli .... 
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an injunction should be issued, she or he must grapple with the 
difficult issue of the potential "waste" of public funds, and, as a result, 
the traditional equitable balancing tests tend to be tilted in favor of 
the project's completion. In such cases, judges are mindful of the 
public nature of their roles, knowing that "[t]heir peers on the bench, 
their clerks, counsel, law professors, and politicians in the other 
branches of government all scrutinize" their decrees.40 
In the Tellico Dam litigation, the Sixth Circuit eventually ordered 
an injunction preventing the immediate completion of the Tellico 
Dam.41 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the injunction 
was upheld,42 but not without the caricature of little-fish-versus-big-
dam pervading the American consciousness and raising judicial con-
cerns about the air of the ridiculous.43 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 
402 (1971) (No. 1066). Although the case was reversed and remanded on other grounds, 
members of the Court were obviously wise to and repulsed by this conscious manufactur-
ing of a statutory exception. During oral arguments, the Court grilled the attorney from 
the Solicitor General's Office, inquiring: 
And by the time the land was cleared, the only feasible route was through the 
park? ... And so that's the end .... So then, in that case, the moving party 
here has no possibility of redress .... When were the contracts, or have the 
contracts been let? ... The contract has been let, hasn't it? ... This last 
month. You went ahead very, very rapidly .... Is that it? ... Rather precipi-
tously, if I may use the word .... So all we can do now is unring the bell. 
Id. at 32-34. 
40 PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW'S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM 
IN AMERICA 20 (1990). 
41 Hill II, 549 F.2d at 1074. 
42 Hill III, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978). The dam was eventually completed after being ex-
empted from all federal laws by way of a rider on the Energy and Appropriations Act of 
1980. CHANDLER, supra note 4, at 165. A large portion of the land surrounding what is now 
Tellico Reservoir was acquired by Cooper Land Development, Inc. and in 1986 became 
Tellico Village, a private recreational-retiremen t community consisting of village housing, 
two championship golf courses, a yacht club, a country club, and a community center. 
COOPER LAND DEV., INC., FACT BOOK: TELLICO VILLAGE 1-3 (n.d.). Cooper Land Devel-
opment's base of operations in Tellico Village is located in Chota Center. Sec id. at 7. This 
appears to be a misplaced homage to Chota-"the sacred capital of the Cherokee 
[I] ndians, their Jerusalem or Mecca "-which is now under the waters of the Tellico Reser-
voir. Comp01"C id., witll CHANDLER, supra note 4, at 164, and Plater, supra note 3, at 807. 
43 In conference, Justice Blackmun noted that in "[t]his ... fable of the snail darter 
and the Tellico Dam, common sense would mandate the completion of Tellico Dam." Jus-
tice William Brennan, ConfCl"CllCe Notes 01/ lVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), in THE SUPREME 
COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985), at 151 (Del Dickson ed., 2001). Justice Marshall, 
observing that the statute could only be interpreted as requiring the halting of the dam's 
construction, bluntly added, "Congress has the right to be ajackass." Id. 
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Mter the Tellico Dam controversy, Congress attempted to rectifY 
this sunk costs phenomenon by amending the ESA to prohibit federal 
agencies from making "any irreversible or irretrievable commitment 
of any resources" to agency actions or projects that have "the effect of 
foreclosing the formulation or implementation of any reasonable and 
prudent alternatives" before interagency consultation.44 This provi-
sion may effectively remove the amount of money spent in violation of 
the ESA, or sunk costs, from factoring into the equitable balance.45 
This Note will examine the traditional concerns of a court sitting 
in equity, and how courts have addressed this sunk costs strategy when 
contemplating the issuance of a permanent injunction46 in the face of 
a statutory violation. The Note will not address situations where the 
equitable discretion of the courts has been explicitly altered by stat-
ute,47 but rather, it will examine what role, if any, sunk costs should 
play in the granting of an injunction when a government agency has 
violated the law. Part I discusses the historical development of the in-
junction and courts of equity. Part II concerns the origin of the bal-
ancing of the utilities doctrine. The application of this doctrine to 
situations involving private defendants and violations of private or 
public law is explored in Part III. The special circumstance involving a 
defendant-agency and the balancing of the utilities doctrine is dis-
cussed in Part N. 
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 
An injunction is an equitable remedy employed for the protec-
tion of the integrity of established rights from prospective harm.48 In 
the courts of the United States, equitable remedies do not necessarily 
derive from a statutory grant of power to the courts, but rather "[t] he 
essence of a court's equity power lies in its inherent capacity to adjust 
remedies in a feasible and practical way to eliminate the conditions or 
44 Endangered Species Act of 1973. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (2000). 
45 However, the actual results of the implementation of this amendment have been 
questioned. See generally Kopf, supra note 33 (arguing that despite this "sunk costs" 
amendment to the ESA, the sunk costs strategy remains a powerful tool). 
46 A permanent injunction is distinct from a temporary injunction. The former is the 
court's final grant of complete relief after a trial on the merits, while the latter is used to 
maintain the status quo while the court is in the process of determining the plaintiff's right 
to a permanent injunction. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987). 
47 A court's equitable jurisdiction can be restricted by a clear and valid legislative 
command. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982). 
48Id. at 311; 1 THOMAS CARL SPELLING, A TREATISE ON INJUNCTION AND OTHER Ex-
TRAORDINARY REMEDIES 12-14 (2d ed. 1901). 
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redress the injuries caused by unlawful action. "49 As a general princi-
ple, the scope of the courts' equitable powers cannot be denied or 
limited without a clear and valid legislative directive.50 Outside such 
legislative shackling, the courts look to the traditional principles of 
equity jurisprudence.51 
An American judge sitting in equity has strong ties to the early 
political philosophy of the Greeks, the procedures of the Roman Em-
pire's legal system, and the traditions of the English courts of chan-
cery.52 Therefore, a brief examination of the development of equity 
jurisdiction and the use of injunctions is helpful to create a basis for 
the discussion of current doctrines and concerns of the courts of eq-
uity in the United States. 
A. The Greek Concej}t ofEpieikeia 
Although there were ancient cultures that had addressed the 
problems of law and governance well before the Greeks, the Greek 
philosophers were among the first to record a true analysis of the as-
sociations between law, justice, and the individua1.53 The surviving 
philosophical writings from the period between 420 and 320 B.C. have 
had an impact on the legal systems of both the Roman and English 
empires, and they form the basis of a European classical education.54 
It is therefore appropriate to use the ancient Greeks as a starting 
point. 
A concern for relieving the individual from the rigors of the 
law-the Greek concept of epieikeia, or equity-can be dearly dis-
cerned from the works of Plato and Aristotle. In Plato's last work, The 
Laws, he identifies the dilemma that results from a government's 
49 Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 487 (1992); see Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 
32,43 (1991) (emphasis added). For a further example, note that the Constitution grants 
"[t] he judicial Power of the United States" to "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under 
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made ... under their Author-
ity," but does not afford an equitable remedy power to federal courts. See U.S. CON ST. art. 
III, §§ I, 2. 
50 Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) ("Unless a statute in so 
many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction 
in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied."). 
51 Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 313-14. 
52 See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 64 (Arno Press Inc., 
reprint ed. 1972) (l836);].M. KELLY, A SHORT HIS'IDRY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY I, 39 
(1992). 
53 KELLY, supra note 52, at 1. 
54 See id. at 1-2, 39; T.A. Sinclair, Translator's Introduction to ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 
13, 15-17 (T.A. Sinclair trans., Penguin Books 1992). 
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need to pass general legislation and a court's need to apply these laws 
to individual cases.55 Through a dialogue between Cleinias and an 
Athenian, Plato notes that when a law is violated, the circumstances 
surrounding each individual case may "differ in a thousand and one 
different ways. "56 Observing the impossibility of legislating to address 
all variations of transgression, he concludes that "some details ought 
to be left to the courts," so that the court may assign fines or punish-
ments according to its "discretion. "57 
Later, in Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle, once a member of Plato's 
famous Academy, elaborates on this notion of judicial discretion and 
further develops the idea of equity: 
Hence whenever the law makes a universal rule, but in this 
particular case what happens violates the ... universal rule, 
here the legislator falls short, and has made an error by mak-
ing an unconditional rule. Then it is correct to rectifY the 
deficiency; this is what the legislator would have said himself 
if he had been present there, and what he would have pre-
scribed, had he known, in his legislation . 
. . . And this is the nature of what is decent-rectification 
of law in so far as the universality of law makes it deficient.58 
In The Politics, Aristotle clarifies the concept of equity and 
qualifies it as being subordinate to the law.59 He argues that where the 
law is clearly applicable to the given circumstances of a case, "it is the 
law's rule and decisions that will be best"-superior to the decisions of 
any citizen.60 Reliance on the decision of a human being is appropri-
ate only in cases where the law is inadequate.61 Equity, although per-
meating Greek political philosophy, was not recognized by the Athe-
nian legal system, which was bound by the strict letter of the law.62 
55 PLATO, THE LAWS 396 (Trevor J. Saunders trans., Penguin Books 1975). 
56Id. 
57Id. 
58 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 144-45 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 
1985). 
59 See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 226-28 (T.A. Sinclair trans., Penguin Books 1992). 
60 Id. at 227-28. 
61 See id. 
62 KELLY, supra note 52, at 29. 
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B. The Enman Concept of Aequitas and the Early Budding of the Injunction 
In the Roman Empire, the Greek concept of equity was slowly 
incorporated into the Roman legal system.63 The roots of the modern 
day injunction-the jJrt1Jt01iall interdict-can be traced to this period 
as wel1.64 
1. The JllS P1'l1!tOI' 
Although Greek, specifically Aristotelian, philosophies had a 
strong influence on many aspects of Roman law, the Greek concept of 
equity and what the Romans called aequitas were tied together in the 
person of the j)l'(£tOI' in the Roman civil law system.65 The pl'mtol' was an 
elected official who controlled access to the Roman legal system.66 
Parties would initiate litigation by contacting the prmt01; who would 
define the basic issues in a case, write them down in a simple formula, 
and then demand answers to the questions from the judge whom the 
parties had chosen.67 
The pl'mtol's, by framing the issues submitted to the judges, had 
enormous power over the legal process, and began to use this power 
to inject concepts of aeqllitas into the Roman civil law system.68 The 
resulting JllS Pl'mt01illm, or pl'mi01ian law, was comprised of amorphous 
equitable concepts. It was concerned with the overall fairness of the 
result and was based on laws common to humankind, which originate 
from a preexisting state of nature.69 
This idea of aeqllitas had been phrased in several ways: good faith, 
fairness, and "honest dealing as between honest people. "70 Assessing 
the practical application of aeqllitas by the pl'mtoTS, Papinian explained, 
"[P] l'mtol'ian law is that which in the public interest the pl'mtoTS have 
63 Thomas Edward Scrutton, Roman Law Influence in Chancery, Church Courts, A.drniralty, 
and Law Merchant, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 208, 216 
(1907) [hereinafter SELECT ESSAYS]; sec]. INST. 1.2.1, 1.2.2. 
64 Sec]. INST. 4.15.1; 2 STORY, supra note 52, at 158. 
65 Sec KELLY, supra note 52, at 52. 
66 DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE 6 (1999). 
67 Sec id.; KELLY, supra note 52, at 55. 
68 Sec KELLY, supra note 52, at 54-57; Scrutton, supra note 63, at 217; see also CICERO, 
ON DUTIES bk. III, ch. 4, § 7, reprinted in CICERO: SELECTED WORKS (Michael Grant trans., 
Penguin Books 1971). 
69 Scrutton, supra note 63, at 216; sec]. INST. 1.2.1, 1.2.2. In the preface to the Institutes, 
a law textbook that Emperor Justinian ordered to accompany the production of his great 
Digest, the hope is expressed that the emperor will "repel the inequities of men who abuse 
the laws" by every legal means.]. INST. l.l.pr. 
70 CICERO, supra note 68, bk. III, ch. 4, § 7. 
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introduced in aid or supplementation or correction of the [civil 
law] ."71 Indeed, pra:t01ian law was considered the "living voice of the 
[civil law]. "72 Roman aequitas, by allowing the pra:tor to frame the is-
sues of a dispute with the aim of correcting the perceived harshness of 
the civil law, dramatically expanded the powers of the Pl'a:t01;73 Notice, 
however, that these concerns of the pra:tol'were injected into the liabil-
ity stage of litigation. As will be discussed infra, once liability or rights 
were established by the Roman judge, the pra:to/s next function was 
simply that of enforcement. 
2. The Interdict 
In addition to his increased discretion, the pl'a:tor could issue in-
terdicts, if they were required, as a remedial or enforcement too1. 74 
Similar to the modern use of injunctions by English and American 
courts, "[i]nterdicts were .. , forms and formulations of words 
whereby the pra:tol' directed or forbade that something be done."75 
Interdicts were of three forms: exhibitory, restoratory, and prohibi-
tory,76 By the exhibitory interdict, the Pl'a:tOl' compelled the produc-
tion of some thing or person.77 In issuing a restoratory interdict, the 
71 See DIG. 1.1.7.1 (Papinian, Definitions 2) (emphasis added); Scrutton, supra note 63, 
at 216. 
72 DIG. 1.1.8 (Marcian, Institutes 1); see DIG. 1.1.7.1 (Papinian, Definitions 2). Evi-
dence of this pnetorialllaw can be found in the pages of two of the three final authoritative 
Roman civil law texts, known as the C01PUS }luis. Emperor Justinian commissioned the two 
texts, the Institutes and the Digest, before the fall of the Roman Empire. See]. INST. 1.I.pr., 
1.2.1, 1.2.2; DIG. 1.1.7.1 (Papinian); COQUILLETTE, supra note 66, at 4-5; Peter Stein, The 
Glossators of the Civil Law, i1l FRANCIS DE ZULUETA & PETER STEIN, THE TEACHING OF Ro-
MAN LAW IN ENGLAND AROUND 1200, at xiii, xiv (1990). There were three main texts that 
were the basis of Roman law: the Institutes, the Digest, and the Codex. COQUILLETH:, supra 
note 66, at 4-5. The Digest was a collection of all of the most authoritative sections of the 
previous Roman legal texts. Id. Mter the Digest was complete, all other Roman legal texts 
were ordered destroyed to avoid conflicting statements of the law; fragments of one text, 
the Institutes of Gaius, did escape this fate. Id. at 5. The Institutes was a text for students of 
the law based on the Digest. Id. The Codex was a compilation of all of the imperial statutes. 
Id. These three works form the body of Roman law, or the Corpus }lois, and were com-
pleted in 533 A.D. Id. at 4-5. Some commentators would include the compilation of Em-
peror Justinian's later legislation, the Novels, as part of the C01PIlS JllIis as well. See Stein, 
sllpra, at xiii. 
73 See KELLY, supra note 52, at 52. 
74 See]. INST. 4.15.pr., 4.15.1; HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 44 (Univ. of Ariz. 
Press 1986) (1864). 
75]. INST. 4.15.pr.; see 2 STORY, supra note 52, at 158. As with the injunction, the inter-
dicts applied in personam. See DIG. 43.1.1.3 (Ulpian, Edict 67). 
76]. INST. 4.15.1; 2 STORY, supm note 52, at 159-60. 
77 J. INST. 4.15.1; 2 STORY, supra note 52, at 160. 
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jJTmtoT commanded that a person's possession of an object be re-
stored.78 By way of a prohibitory interdict, certain actions were for-
bidden.79 The prohibitory interdicts were the most common of the 
three, and they are closely related to injunctions issued by modern 
English and American courts.80 
Here, at the remedy stage of the litigation, after the judges had 
determined the rights of the parties following the pTmt01's formula, 
the Roman prmtoT was required to issue some form of remedy when 
necessary to ensure that established rights would be protected.81 
C. English COUTts of Chancery and Equity 
Traces of the Roman legal system were, for the most part, wiped 
clean from the memories of the English when the Roman occupation 
of England ended in 410 A.D. After the Norman Conquest of England 
in 1066, as the English common law system was taking shape, there 
was a dramatic resurgence in Roman civil law and Emperor Justinian's 
C01PUS JU1is.82 Roman manuscripts had made their way over to Eng-
land in the twelfth century, and Englishmen started going to conti-
nental Europe for their education, mainly to Bologna, where there 
was an intense study of the discovered Roman legal texts.83 By the lat-
ter half of the twelfth century, civil law was being taught at Oxford.84 
Also, Vacarius had begun his teaching of the civil law in England, and 
published his Libet· Pauperu1n, a legal text consisting of excerpts from 
the Digest and the Institutes for those who could not afford the full 
texts.85 Roman Law so permeated English legal thinking that the two 
early English treatises in English common law, Glanville and Bmcton, 
78 J. INST. 4.15.1; 2 STORY, supra note 52, at 159-60. 
79 J. INST. 4.15.1; 2 STORY, supra note 52, at 159. 
80 1 SPELLING, S'ltpra note 48, at 2-3. 
81 4 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 937 (1941); see 
GEO. 1\JCKER BISPHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 24-28 (5th ed. 1893). 
82 COQUILLETI"E, supra note 66, at 37; Peter Stein, Vacarius and the Civil Law in England, 
in ZULUETA & STEIN, supra note 72, at xxii. 
83 Stein, S'ltpra note 82, at xxii. 
84 Roman civil law would continue to be the only law taught at Oxford for centuries, 
until Sir William Blackstone made the common law system part of the curriculum in 1758 
when he was appointed as the first Vinerian Chair. Frederick William Maitland, English Law 
and the Renaissallce, ill 1 SELECT ESSAYS, S'ltpra note 63, at 168, 198-99; id. at 193 ("The 
mice ... pleading that English law was the law that should be taught in English universities 
was a voice that for centuries cried in the wilderness."); see 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *4-*5, *16. 
85 Stein, S'ltpra note 82, at xxii-xxv. 
702 Environmental A.ffairs [Vol. 30:689 
both pay homage to or incorporate the Roman texts.86 In a vain effort 
to put an end to the invasion of Roman civil law into the English 
common law system, King Stephen expelled Vacarius from England, 
and, in a letter to the Mayor of London, ordered the prohibition of 
the teaching of the civil law in London.87 
These desperate actions by King Stephen may have slowed Ro-
man influence on the common law courts, but it did not stop the ec-
clesiastics from teaching civil law and canon law, which is intimately 
tied to the civil law, in their schools and monasteries.88 
Drawing heavily from the Roman Corpus Juris and from Scripture, 
Gratian, a possible teacher and monk in Bologna, completed his Decre-
tum, a codification and harmonization of the canon laws.89 Published 
in 1140, the Decretum became the standard text used by the Roman 
Catholic Church for teaching canon law.90 This influence of Roman 
law would be most prominent in the English chancery courts. 
1. Roman Influence on the Court of Chancery's Determination of 
Liability 
The development of the English chancellors and English equity 
jurisprudence parallels that of the Roman pra!tor and pTa!tOlian law. 
Similar to the Roman pra!tOl~ the position of the Lord Chancellor of 
the High Court of Chancery originated as a ministerial position under 
86 See Scrutton, supra note 63, at 209-12; William Stubbs, The History of the Calion Law in 
England, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS, supra note 63, at 248, 260. Glallville, the great treatise on 
common law procedure, cites Justinian's Institutes in the preface to the manual. Scrutton, 
supra note 63, at 209-12. Bracton, the first great treatise dealing with the substantive side of 
the English common law system, incorporates significant portions of the COlPUS J1t1is. 
Stubbs, supra, at 260. 
87 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at *18-*19; Stubbs, supra note 86, at 258,262. 
88 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at *19-*20. 
89 Katherine Gordley, Intmductioll to GRATIAN, THE TREATISE ON LAWS WITH TIlE OR-
DINARY GLOSS, at iv, x, xviii (Augustine Thompson & James Gordley trans., Catholic Univ. 
of Am. Press 1993) (1140). 
90 Id. at xviii. Echoing the Roman concept of aeqllitas, Gratian observes that "there are 
many [enactments) that should be tempered, either for the necessity of the times, or in 
consideration of age." GRATIAN, supra note 89, at 53. The Decretum was the first written 
work of what came to be known to canonists as the CO/pus Juris Canonic;. COQUILLETTE, 
supra note 66, at 184; Gordley, supra note 89, at xvi. Catholic philosophers were also 
strongly influenced by the Summa Tlteologica 'Hitten by Aristotle-influenced St. Thomas 
Aquinas. COQUILLETTE, supra note 66, at 185. Aquinas, citing canon law sources, Scripture, 
and Roman texts, observed the need to look to the intent of the legislature when looking 
at any particular case, in order to avoid a harsh application of a statute. See ST. THOMAS 
AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. II, pt. 2, question 96, art. 6, rep/in ted in THE POLITI-
CAL IDEAS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 75-77 (Dino Bigongiari ed., 1953). 
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the king, which only later became vested with true judicial duties.91 In 
the beginning of English equity jurisprudence, the chancellor acted, 
essentially, as the "secretary" of the king, issuing writs that allowed a 
petitioner to bring suit before the king's courts: the courts of the 
King's Bench, the Common Pleas, and the Exchequer.92 The chancel-
lor would send the petitioner to one of the three courts where the 
petitioner's claim could be properly addressed.93 In some cases, where 
the suit did not properly fall under the jurisdiction of the other 
courts, the chancellor himself would have jurisdiction to grant relief 
to the petitioner.94 In addition, petitions to the king or the King's 
Council for royal grace or favor were soon delegated to the chancellor 
first for administration, and then for final decision.95 
In the beginning, the chancellor was always an ecclesiastic be-
cause not many other people were capable of administering a position 
that demanded such a high level of literacy.96 As a result, the ecclesias-
tic chancellor was almost always well versed in Roman civil law as well 
as the Roman-influenced canon law, but he often had only the most 
superficial knowledge of English common law.97 Consequently, prin-
ciples of the Roman civil law and canon law would often be used to 
resolve cases that were brought before the chancellor.98 
91 3 BLACKSlUNE, supra note 84, at *46; 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *328 n.D; THEO-
DORE F.T. PLUNCKNETT, A CONCISE HISlURY OF 'IHE COMMON LAW 695 (Little, Brown & 
Co., 5th ed. 1956). 
92 BISPHAM, supra note 81, at 1, 5-6 (5th ed. 1893). 
93 Id. at 6. 
94Id. 
95 See Scrutton, supra note 63, at 214. 
96 3 BLACKSlUNE, supra note 84, at *47. Until 1530, only a few non-ecclesiastics had 
held the position of Lord Chancellor. Scrutton, supra note 63, at 214-15. 
97See CHRISlUPHER ST. GERMAN, THE REPLICATION OF A SERJEANT AT THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND, reprinted illJ.A. GUY, CHRISlUPHER ST. GERMAN ON CHANCERY AND STATUTE 101 
(J.A. Guyed., Selden Soc'y 1985) (1787); MAINE, supra note 74, at 42-43; Scrutton, supra 
note 63, at 214-15. In the biting criticism of the Sergeant of Law, St. German writes: 
SERJAUNTE .... For moste commonly the Chauncellors of England have bene 
spirituall men, that hath had but superficiall knowlege of the lawes of the 
real me ... I may Iykyn my lorde Chauncellor, that is not lernyde yn the lawes 
of the Realme, to hyme that standith yn the vale of White Horse, fer from the 
horse, and beholdithe the horse; and the horse semythe and apperith to hym 
a goodly horse, and well proporcionede yn every poyncte. And then, if he 
cllmme nere to the place where the horse is, he can perceh'e no horse, not 
nor proporcion of any horse. 
ST. GERMAN, supra, at 101-02. 
98 Scrutton, supra note 63, at 215. 
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Further extension of the chancellor's jurisdiction resulted from 
the fact that the ecclesiastic chancellor was regarded as the "keeper of 
the king's conscience"-the king being the "fountain of justice. ''99 As 
such, the chancellor's jurisdiction, in addition to jurisdiction over 
those tasks delegated to him, was extraordinary, eventually extending 
to all matters of conscience. loo Borrowing from civil and canon law, 
the chancellor, concerned about the overall fairness of a result, would 
assert jurisdiction over a case and rectified the failures of the common 
law courts to recognize a right, to enforce a right, or to grant relief 
where a "petitioner was unable to obtain redress owing to the position 
or powerful connections of his adversary. "101 
The chancellor exercising his equitable jurisdiction, not bound 
by preceden t or formal rules, looked to the particulars of a case; as 
the pradoI' did with the civil law, the chancellor relieved the rigors of 
the otherwise inflexible common law. l02 Seeing that the chancery's 
power emanated from the "king's conscience" and that conscience 
was what should guide decisions, Lord Bacon commented: 
A judge ought to prepare his way to a just sentence, as God 
useth to prepare his way, by raising valleys and taking down 
hills: so when there appeareth on either side an high hand, 
violent prosecution, cunning advantages taken, combina-
tion, power, great counsel, then is the virtue of a judge seen, 
to make inequality equal, that he may plant his judgment as 
upon an even ground. l03 
The chancellor's jurisdiction expanded over time, and by the 
fourteenth century the High Court of Chancery came into being, ow-
ing its existence, at least in part, to the inflexibility and restricted ju-
risdiction of the common law courts, and the deficiencies inheren t in 
the strict application of the common law. 104 Additionally, the common 
law courts refused to embrace the concept of equity. 105 
The chancellor's discretionary power to assert jurisdiction over 
cases previously decided by common law courts and grant relief in the 
99 See 3 BLACKSTIJNE. supra note 84, at *46; 3 COKE, supra note 91, at *328 n.D; Scmt-
ton, supra note 63, at 214. 
JOO BISPIIAM, supra note 81, at 11 (5th ed. 1893). 
IOJ [d. (emphasis removed); see MAINE, supra note 74, at 42-43. 
IO~ See MAINE, supra note 74, at 42-43; Scrutton, supra note 63, at 216. 
103 Francis Bacon, Of judicature (quoting, in italics, Isaiah 40:4), rep/luted ill FRANCIS 
BACON: A COLLECTION OF HIS WORKS 185 (Sidney Warhaft ed., 1965) (1625). 
104 See id. at 6-7; 2 STIJRY, supra note 52, at 54-55. 
105 BISPHAM, supra note 81, at 7 (11 th ed. 1931). 
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name of equity was viewed by some critics as eviscerating English 
statutory and common law. I06 In response, Christopher St. German 
offered a much-needed justification in the form of a dialogue be-
tween a doctor of divinity and a student of the common law-the 
influential Doctor and Stlldent.107 His theory was based on canon law 
and the familiar Roman concept of aeqllitas. I08 St. German's doctor of 
divinity argued, with respect to equity's treatment of statutes, that eq-
uity 
considers all of the particular circumstances of the deed and 
is tempered with the sweetness of mercy. And equity must 
always be observed in every rule of man and in every general 
rule thereof, and knew he well that said thus. Laws covet to 
be ruled by equity .... It is not possible to make any general 
rule of law but that it should fail in some case. And therefore 
makers of law take heed to such things as may often come, 
and not to every particular case, for they could not though 
they would, and therefore to follow the words of the law is in 
some cases both against justice and the common wealth: 
wherefore in some cases it is good a1ld even necessary to leave 
the words of the law, and to follow that which reason and jus-
tice require, and to that equity is ordained, that is to say 
temper and mitigate the rigor of the law. 109 
106 Sec e.g .• JOHN SELDEN. TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 43 (Sir Frederick Pollock ed., 
Selden Soc'y 1927) (1689). 
107 See PLUNCKNETr, supra note 91, at 279. 
108 See id. 
109 CHRISTI>PHER ST. GERMAN, ST. GERMAN'S DOCTI>R AND STUDENT 95, 97 (T.F.T. 
Pluncknett & J.L. Barton eds., Selden Soc'y 1974) (1530) (Note author's translation from 
old English). The full original passage reads: 
Id. 
Equytye is a ryghtwysenes that consideryth all the pertyculer cyrcumstaunces 
of the dede / the whiche also is temperyd with the swetnes of mercye. And 
suche an equytye must alway be obseruyd in euery lawe of man / and in eu-
ery generall rewle therof / & that knewe he wei that sayd thus. Lawes couet to 
be rewlyd by equytye .... It is not possyble to make any generall rewle of the 
lawe / but that it shall fayle in some case. And therfore makers of lawes take 
hede to suche thynges as may often come and not to euery particuler case / 
for they coulde not though they wolde And therfore to folowe the wordes of 
the lawe / were in some case both against Iustyce & the common weith: 
wherefore in some cases it is good and even necessary to leue the wordis of the 
lawe / & to folowe that reason and Justyce requyreth / & to that intent 
equytie is ordeyned / that is to say to tempre and myttygate the rygoure of 
the lawe. 
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Equity, St. German asserted, did not abrogate statutory law; rather it 
merely voiced implied exceptions to the law for particular circumstances, 
supplied by the law of God and by reason, the background against 
which legislators enact generallaws. l1O 
Although the chancellors would insist that they were not under-
mining the common law courts, the fact that the laws of England were 
ultimately subject to the discretion and "conscience" of the chancellor 
continued to be criticized. lll John Selden argued by analogy that if 
the conscience of the chancellor is the measure of equity, then it 
would be too unpredictable a measure to be a basis for any law, for as 
the length of the chancellor's foot differs from chancellor to chancel-
lor, so does a chancellor's conscience. 112 With the English chancellor, 
as with the Roman pr(£t01~ the only restrictions on the exercise of the 
court's discretion were found in the chancellor's early training in civil 
law and in the restraints of professional opinion.1I3 The fact that 
precedent did not bind future decisions of the chancellor exacer-
bated concerns about the discretionary nature of the chancellor's 
powers. 114 
110 Scc id. ("[Ejxcepcion is secretely vnderstande in ellery generall rewle of ellery po-
sytYlle lawe .... [Y]f any lawe were made by man without any sllche excepcyon expressyd 
or implyed it were manyfestly vnresonable / & were not to be sllfferyd .... "). 
111 Sce ST. GERMAN, supra note 97, at 10; SELDEN, supra note 106, at 43. St. German's 
Sergean t of Law 0 bserved: 
[Y]n what lIncertayntie shall the kinges sllbgiettes stande whan they shalbe 
put from the lawe of the Realme, and be compellede to be ordered by the 
discrecion and conscience of oon man? And namely, for asmooche as con-
science is a thinge of gret uncerteyntie .... And so divers men, divers con-
science. 
/d. at 101. Blackstone would later note that chancellors had bestowed upon themselves 
unlimited discretion "partly from their ignorance of the law ... partly from their ambition 
or lust for power ... but principally from the narrow and unjust decisions of the courts of 
law." 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at *433. 
[d. 
112 SELDEN, supra note 106, at 43. The often quoted language of John Selden reads: 
Equity is A Roguish thing, for Law wee have a measure know what to trust too. 
Equity is according to y" conscience of him y' is Chan cellO. , and as y' is larger 
or narrower soe is equity Tis all one as if they should make y" Standard for y' 
measure wee call A foot, to be y' Chancellors foot; what an uncertain measure 
would this be; One Chancellor ha's a long foot another A short foot a third an 
indifferent foot; tis y' same thing in ye Chancellors Conscience. 
113 MAINE, supra note 74, at 62-63. It may be noted that the Roman prl£torwas also ex-
pressly guided by the overarching concern for the safety of the state. [d. at 63. 
114 See HOFFER, supra note 40, at 10-12. 
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The English chancellors made an attempt to alleviate these con-
cerns in the 1600s by establishing rules of the chancery courts.ll5 
Richard Francis furthered this effort by summarizing the absolute 
rules of equity in 1726.116 He performed a survey of the cases in the 
High Court of Chancery and published his Maxims of Equity, outlining 
the fourteen important tenets of equity jurisprudence-the canons of 
equity jurisprudence.ll7 As equity jurisprudence developed, the rea-
soning behind cases slowly became uniform, and chancellors started 
to be guided by precedent, forming specific equitable doctrines and 
defenses. lIS This movement towards regularity and predictability came 
to fruition in the 1700s, as the English chancellors consistently used 
precedent and doctrinal rules, including Francis's "maxims," in place 
ofthe former ad hoc approach.1 19 
The uniformity of equity jurisprudence led to the publication of 
a case reporter and treatises. A collection of equity case law was made 
available in 1732 as Equity Cases ilbridged; and in 1737 Henry Ballow 
offered the first comprehensive equity treatise, A Treatise of Equity, and 
noted the desire for stability in equity jurisprudence, stating, "[I] t is 
dangerous to extend the authority of this court further than the prac-
tice offormer times. "120 In 1741, Viner, after whom the Vinerian Chair 
115 [d. at 17. 
116 [d. at 10-11. 
117 [d. These doctrines consisted of: 
(I) He that will have equity done to him, must do it to the same person; (2) 
he that hath committed inequity, shall not have equity; (3) equality is equity; 
(4) it is equity that should make satisfaction. he who receives the benefit; (5) 
it is equity that should have satisfaction, he who sustained the loss; (6) equity 
suffers not a right without a remedy; (7) equity relieves against accidents; (8) 
equity prevents mischief; (9) equity prevents multiplicity of suits; (10) equity 
regards length of tinle; (11) equity will not suffer a double satisfaction to be 
taken; (12) equity suffers not advantage to be taken of a penalty or forfeiture, 
where compensations can be made; (13) equity regards not the circumstance. 
but the substance of the act; and (14) where the equity is equal. the law must 
prevail. 
!d. at 1O-11 (altered for legibility and internal brackets removed) (quoting RICHARD 
FRANCIS. MAXIMS OF EQUIIY, at iii-iv (1726)). 
118 See PLUNCKNETT. supra note 91. at 692-94. 
119 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN. A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 22 (1973); HOFFER, supra 
note 40. at 11; MAINE. supra note 74. at 63. 
120 1 HENRY BALLOW. A TREATISE OF EQUIIY 21-23 (John Fonblanque ed .• Luke Han-
sard & Sons 5th ed. 1820) (1737); see PLUNCKNETT. supra note 91. at 694. Recalling the 
original need for equity jurisdiction, Ballow v,Tites: 
Equity ... as it stands for the whole of natural justice. is more excellent than 
any human institution; neither are positiYe laws ... any further binding than 
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at Oxford University is named, began publishing his collection of re-
ports, the General A.bridgment of Law and Eqllity.121 
This rush toward uniformity and predictability in equity jurispru-
dence had the effect of severely binding the chancellor's previously 
limitless discretion. 122 In the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
Lord Eldon sought to further limit the chancellor's discretion, com-
menting in Gee v. Pritchard: 
The doctrines of [the courts of chancery] ... ought to be as 
well settled and made uniform almost as those of common 
law, laying down fixed principles, but taking care that they 
are applied according to the circumstances of each case. I 
cannot agree that the doctrines of this court are to be 
changed with every succeeding judge. Nothing would inflict 
or give me greater pain in quitting this place than the recol-
lection that I had done anything to justifY the reproach that 
the equity of this court varies like the chancellor's fOOt. 123 
This was a dramatic change in equity jurisprudence, transitioning 
from an ever-changing practice based in the almost absolute discre-
tion of the chancellor and the loose guidance of the civil and canon 
law, to what became a "controlled, constrained science of equity, ancil-
lary to cOInmon-law. "124 
The chancellor's discretion was so tempered by formalizing the 
equitable doctrines that in 1758 Blackstone observed that an equity 
court and a common law court both interpreted statutes according to 
the same principles of reason and justice, and that the unlimited dis-
cretion that had previously been characteristic of courts of equity 
"hath totally been disclaimed by their successors. "125 Some well-settled 
they are agreeable to the law of God and nature .... [A]s the rules of the 
municipal law are finite, and the subject of it infinite, there will often fall out 
cases which cannot be determined by them .... 
1 BALLOW, supra, at 8. 
121 PLUNCKNETT, supra note 91, at 694. 
122 See VEEDER, iI. Century of English judicature, 1800-1900, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS, supra 
note 63, at 730, 735-36. 
123 fd. at 736 (quoting Gee v. Pritchard, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 674 (Ch. 1818)). 
124 HOFFER, supra note 40, at 12. 
125 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 84, at *430-33; see BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH 
OF THE LAW 132-37 (1924); 1 COKE, supra note 91, at *29 n.D. Referring to the role of a 
judge, Justice Cardozo writes: 
Unique situations can never have their answers ready made as in the com-
plete letter-writing guides or the manuals of the art of c011Yersation. Justice is 
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doctrines of equity were incorporated into the English common law 
and were used in common law courtS.126 Blackstone observed that the 
courts of equity had become "governed by established rules, and 
bound by precedents, from which they do not depart .... [A]ll these 
... are plainly rules of positive law. "127 
By 1788, Alexander Hamilton, justifYing the grant of equity juris-
diction to the federal courts in the United States Constitution, noted: 
"It is true that [in courts of equity] the principles by which that relief 
is governed are now reduced to a regular system."128 He also espoused 
a concept of equity similar to St. German's philosophy: the equity 
court must not operate outside of the law, but must uphold the spirit 
of the law while applying the legislature's implied exceptions.129 
Joseph Story concurred, in his 1836 equity treatise, with the idea 
that equity must follow the law and cannot take a contrary position 
where the law has clearly spoken.l30 He further noted that it is the 
role of equity "to defend the law from crafty evasions, delusions, and 
mere subtleties, invented and contrived to evade and elude the 
Cormnon Law, whereby such as have undoubted right are made 
remediless .... Equity does not destroy the law, not create it, but as-
sists it. "131 
not to be taken by storm. She is to be wooed by slow advances. Substitute stat-
ute for decision, and you shift the center of authority, but add no quota of in-
spired wisdom. 
CARDOZO, supra, at 134. 
126 See 3 BLACKST'ONE, mpra note 84, at *430-32. 
127 [d. at *432. These settled doctrines of equity are set forth in Ballow's treatise as well 
as the better known Commentaries 011 Equity JU1isprudellce by Joseph Story. See generally 1 BAL-
LOW, supra note 120; 2 BALLOW, supra note 120; 1 ST'ORY, supra note 52; 2 ST'ORY, supra note 
52. 
128 THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 540 n.* (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., 
Mod. Libr. 2000). 
129 COlllpareTHE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 128, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton), with 
ST. GERMAN, supra note 97, at 95,97. Hamilton notes: 
It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretence of a repugnancy, 
may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legis-
lature .... The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be 
disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGEMENT, the consequence would 
equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 128, at 540 11.* (Alexander Hamilton). 
130 1 ST'ORY, supra note 52, at 72. 
131 [d. at 18-19 (quoting DudleY". Dudley, 24 Eng. Rep. 118, 119 (Ch. 1705». 
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2. Roman Influence on the Court of Chancery's Remedies 
Once the chancellor, following the settled equitable doctrines 
and the canons of equity, decided the case, and the liabilities and 
rights of the parties were settled, he would construct a remedy.132 If a 
plaintiff established a cognizable right, then the chancellor ensured it 
was protected, and he was bound, "to grant every kind of remedy nec-
essary to its complete establishment, protection, and enforcement 
according to its essential nature."133 Due to the early influence of the 
ecclesiastic chancellors, the remedial power of the chancellor was 
largely derived from the powers of the Roman jmet01:134 If equity's 
most extreme remedy-the injunction-was required, then the chan-
cellor would issue the injunction, just as the Roman p1'letorwould have 
issued a prohibitive interdict if needed to protect established rights of 
the parties.135 
Note, however, that an equitable remedy, such as an injunction, 
would be issued as a matter of course in order to protect established 
rights; there was no further determination of the need to withhold an 
equitable remedy, as chancellors were bound to protect the rights that 
were established in the liability stage, in the ensuing remedy stage of 
the litigation.136 Equitable doctrines and the canons were applied in 
the liability stage of litigation. which determined the rights of the 
party to seek relief from the chancery court; equitable doctrines were 
also applied with respect to the other party in the resolution of the 
dispute. 
D. American Courts oj Chancery and Equity 
In the American judicial system, equity jurisprudence took the 
form of that formulated and practiced by the High Court of Chancery 
in England.137 American courts, when addressing questions of equita-
ble relief, look to equity's historical development in the English courts 
132 4 POMEROY. supra note 81. at 937; sec BISPHAM. supra note 81. at 24-28 (5th ed. 
1893). 
133 4 POMEROY, supra note 81, at 937; see BISPHAM, supra note 81, at 24-28 (5th ed. 
1893). 
134 ScruHon, supra note 63, at 224. 
135 4 POMEROY, supra note 81, at 937; sec BISPHAM, supra note 81, at 24-28 (5th ed. 
1893); 1 SPELLING, supra note 48, at 2-3. 
136 4 POMEROY, supra note 81, at 937; sec BISPHAM, supm note 81, at 24-28 (5th ed. 
1893). See genemlly 1 BALLOW, supra note 120; 2 BALLOW, supra note 120; 1 STORY, supm 
note 52; 2 STORY, supm note 52. 
137 See BISPHAM, supra note 81, at 1 (11 th ed. 1931). 
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for guidance.138 The United States inherited this jurisprudence, and 
these prudential concerns and equitable doctrines guide courts in 
their exercise of equitable jurisdiction today.139 
1. Equity in the Colonies and the Early States 
In the eighteenth century, the organization of the courts of eq-
uity was rather uneven across the several American Colonies.140 Some 
Colonies had separate courts of equity; some simply removed the dis-
tinction between common law and equity courts; and in some Colo-
nies the governor and the governor's council acted as the court of 
chancery.141 In those Colonies that had separate courts of equity, the 
administration of these courts was dictated by the English, creating a 
close association between equity jurisdiction and the executive power 
of the King of England, and English colonial policy.142 
Mter the Colonies secured their independence from England, 
the principles of the English chancery courts continued to form the 
basis of equity jurisprudence in the courts of the several States, and 
these principles eventually became fairly uniform across the coun-
try.143 As it stands, equity jurisprudence in America is much closer to 
that of England than the common-law approaches of the two na-
tions.144 As Justice Joseph Story noted, "Equity Jurisprudence, in its 
main streams, flows from the same sources [in America], that it does 
in England, and admits of an almost universal application in its prin-
ciples. "145 
1381d. at 2. 
139 Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Greenpeace Found. 
v. Mineta, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1136 (D. Haw. 2000). 
140 FRIEDMAN, supra note 119, at 47. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 47-48. The use of the chancery court in New York as more of an English 
court of exchequer possibly fueled the existing hostility towards the chancery courts and 
may explain why Alexander Hamilton spent considerable ink in the FedCTalist papers de-
fending the grant of equitable jurisdiction to the federal courts in the Constitution. See id.; 
THE FEDERALIST No. 78. supra note 128, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST 
No. 80, supra note 128, at 512-13 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra 
note 128, at 540 & n.* (Alexander Hamilton); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The Federal-
ist papers were part of a propaganda campaign used to sway New York public opinion to-
wards ratification of the Constitution. Robert Scigliano, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST, 
supra note 128. at viii-ix. 
143 BISPHAM. supra note 81, at 18-19 (11th ed. 1931). 
144 See 1 STORY, supra note 52. at 64. 
145 !d. 
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2. Equity in the Federal Courts 
The United States federal courts' inheritance of English equita-
ble doctrines is apparent by their affirmative recognition of these doc-
trines. 146 The Constitution extends to the federal judiciary jurisdiction 
over "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under [the] Constitution, 
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties .... "147 The Framers un-
derstood this grant to include the settled equity doctrines as devel-
oped by the English chancery courts, to be applied in cases where the 
common law produced an unsatisfactory result. 148 Equity was viewed 
as the defender or protector of the general law from cunning parties 
who might defeat the spirit of the law by taking advantage of its tech-
nicalities. 149 
Reinforcing the source and binding power of traditional equita-
ble principles, the Supreme Court has recognized that the federal 
courts were given "an authority to administer in equity suits the prin-
ciples of the system of judicial remedies which had been devised and 
was being administered by the English chancery court at the time of 
the separation of the two countries. "150 For this reason, district courts 
do not have any authority in granting remedies that were historically 
unavailable to a court of equity,151 and even after the fusion of law and 
equity by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, "the substan-
tive principles of Courts of Chancery remain [ed] unaffected. "152 
It appears that federal courts exercising their equitable jurisdic-
tion would use the same equitable doctrines as the English chancery 
courts to determine liability or the rights of the parties in a dispute, 
146 See Atlas Life Ins. v. W.I. Southern, Inc., 306 V.S. 563, 568 (1939). 
147 V.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
148 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 128, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 80, supra note 128, at 512-13 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST No. 83, 
supra note 128, at 540 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The great and primary use of a court of 
equity is to give relief in extraordinary cases, which are exceptions to general rules .... "); Id. 
at 540 n.* ("[Equitable principles] are in the main applicable to SPECIAL circumstances, 
which form exceptions to the general rules."). 
149 See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 128, at 512-13 (Alexander Hamilton); see 
also 1 STORY, supra note 52, 18-19 (quoting Dudley v. Dudley, 24 Eng. Rep. 118, 119 (Ch. 
1705». 
150 Atlas Life Ins., 306 V.S. at 568; Grupo !\fexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond 
Fund, Inc., 527 V.S. 308,318 (1999). It is beyond the scope of this Note to address any 
possible constitutional constraints that may prevent the federal courts from adopting the 
balancing of the utilities doctrine, which is discussed in Part II infra. 
151 See GrIlPO Mexicano de Desarrollo, 527 V.S. at 318-19. 
152 Stainback v. !\fo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 V.S. 368, 383 n.26 (1949); see FED. R. CIV. P. 
I, 2; HOHER, supra note 40, at 19. 
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the area where the judge's discretion had been tempered.153 As the 
English chancellors and the Roman PTa!tOTS before them, the Ameri-
can judge sitting in equity was bound to protect the parties' rights, 
using existing equitable remedies, as determined in the liability stage 
of the litigation.154 As with the English chancery courts, in the reme-
dies stage of the litigation there was no further determination of the 
need for withholding an equitable remedy.155 
II. INJUNCTIONS AND THE BALANCING OF THE UTILITIES 
Before issuing an iI~unction, the most oppressive of equitable 
remedies, the American courts required that a plaintiff overcome sev-
eral doctrinal hurdles that have English roots.156 Although courts were 
bound to protect a party's determined rights, in order to obtain the 
protection of an injunction, a party had to demonstrate that such a 
remedy was necessary to protect her or his rights by showing: (1) that 
the party would suffer irreparable harm if an injunction was not 
granted;157 and (2) legal remedies were inadequate.158 If these re-
quirements were satisfied, then the courts tailored a remedy to pro-
tect the determined rights of the parties.159 Apparently, it was not un-
til the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, however, that further 
judicial discretion was injected into the remedy stage of litigation-
allowing a court to leave a determined right to go unprotected by a 
court of equity.160 This new discretion took the form of the equitable 
doctrine referred to as the "balanciIlg of the utilities." 
15S Sec supra Part I.B-.D. 
154 See id. 
155 See id. 
156 See 1 SPELLING, supra note 48, at 4 & n.4. This Note assumes the satisfaction of the 
two requirements. 
157 [d. at 4. In the realm of environmental law, the United States Supreme Court has 
noted that "[e]nvironmental injury, by its nature, ... is often permanent or at least of long 
duration, i.e., irreparable." Amoco Prod. Co. v. Viii. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987). 
Although an irreparable environmental harm may be presumed when an environmental 
statute is violated, courts do use caution so as not to "exercise equitable powers loosely or 
casually whenever a claim of 'environmental damage' is asserted." Aberdeen & Rockfish 
R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 409 U.S. 1207, 1217 
(Burger, Circuit Justice 1972); sce Amoco Prod. Co., 480 V.S. at 545. 
158 Amoco Prod. Co., 480 V.S. at 531. 
159 See supra Part I.C. 
160 Scc Daniel R. Coquillette, AIosscs from all Old Mallse: Another Look at Somc Historic 
Propcrly Cases About thc Ellviro1l1l1cnt, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 782-91 (1979). 
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In modern American courts, once a plaintiff has succeeded on 
the merits of the case, and has proved irreparable injury and the in-
adequacy of legal remedies, the judge performs a modified pro forma 
cost-benefit analysis of the rights of the parties, called the "balancing 
of the utilities," before issuing an iI~unction.161 .. [T] he court 'bal-
ances the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to them 
accordiIlg as they may be affected by the granting or withholding of 
the injunction.'"162 This doctrine allows the court to take into account 
the totality of the circumstances so that the burden of the injunction 
on the defendant is not disproportionate compared with the benefits 
to the plaintiff of granting the injunction, or the burden on the plain-
tiff if an injunction is not granted.163 The balancing of the utilities 
doctriIle also weighs the public interest concerns in the issuance or 
denial of the iIljunction.164 The doctriIle appears to have first taken 
root in the English case of St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping.165 
1. St. Helen's Smelting Co. 
The 1865 English case of St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping con-
cerned a common law nuisance, and is considered the point at which 
the balancing of the utilities doctrine first appeared.166 The important 
stage of the St. Helen's Smelting litigation was the appeal to the House 
161 See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982). 
162 See id. (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944)); Hill III, 437 U.S. 
153,193 (1978); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 321 (1944). To be sure, in doing this 
delicate balancing where there is a statutory violation on the part of a government agency, 
no deference is given to an agency's decision or expertise. See Northwest Coalition for 
Alternatives to Pesticides v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588, 590-91 (9th Cir. 1988); Seattle Audubon 
Soc'yv. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (D. Wash. 1991). 
163 See Morgan v. Veach, 139 P.2d 976,980 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943); Kratze v. Indep. 
Order of Odd fellows, Garden City Lodge #11,500 N.W.2d 115,120 (Mich. 1993); lI.liller v. 
City of West Carrollton, 632 N.E.2d 582, 587 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Papanikolas Bros. En-
ters. v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Utah 1975). 
164 HOFFER, supra note 40, at 147. 
165 11 Eng. Rep. 1483 (H.L. 1865). 
166 See Coquillette, supra note 160, at 783; see also St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 
11 Eng. Rep. 1483, 1486-87 (H.L. 1865). The balancing of the utilities doctrine cannot be 
found in the leading equity treatises up until this time. See generally 1 BALLOW, supra note 
120; 2 BALLOW, Sltpra note 120; 1 STORY, supra note 52; 2 STORY, supra note 52. One could 
argue that the true origin lies in the maxim: "[Wlhere there is equal Equity, the law must 
prevail.· See 1 STORY, supra note 52, at 75. 
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of Lords.167 The case was a common law nuisance action brought by 
the proprietor of an estate whose "hedges, trees, shrubs, fruit, and 
herbage," as well as cattle, were damaged by the noxious fumes emit-
ted by a new copper smelting plant. 168 The question in the case was 
not whether an injunction should issue, but whether the trial judge 
gave the jury proper instructions for common law nuisance-instruc-
tions that resulted in the defendant being held liable for monetary 
damages.169 
The holding of the House of Lords seems to support the previous 
rule of nuisance-one must use his or her property so as not to injure 
the property of his neighbor. 170 The House of Lords found that the 
trial judge had given a proper jury instruction and refused to grant a 
new triaL171 The cryptic dicta of two of the appellate judges' opinions, 
however, established the balancing of the utilities doctrine.I72 
Lord Westbury noted that there is a "difference between an ac-
tion brought for a nuisance upon the ground that the alleged nui-
sance produces material injury to the property, and an action brought 
for a nuisance on the ground that the thing alleged to be a nuisance 
is productive of sensible personal discomfort. "173 Lord Cranworth 
added: 
"You must look at it not with a view to the question whether, 
abstractly, that quantity of smoke was a nuisance, but 
whether it was a nuisance to a person in the town" ... 
[B]ecause, if it only added in an infinitesimal degree to the 
quality of smoke, ... the state of the [already polluted] town 
rendered it altogether impossible to call that an actionable 
nuisance. 174 
Out of these dicta, in the United States and in England, St. 
Helen's Smelting has come to stand for the proposition that the com-
mon law nuisance doctrine was subject to a balancing of the utili-
ties.175 Soon after the House of Lords affirmed the St. Helen's Smelting 
167 See Coquillette, supra note 160. at 788. 
168 St. Helen's SlIIelting, 11 Eng. Rep. at 1483. 
169 !d. at 1484. 
170 See Coquillette. mpra note 160. at 788-89. 
171 St. Helen's Smelting. 11 Eng. Rep. at 1486. 
172 Sec Coquillette. supra note 160. at 789-91. 
173 St. Helen's Smelting, 11 Eng. Rep. at 1486 (emphasis added). 
174 /d. at 1487. 
175 Sec Coquillette. supra note 160. at 788. The idea that a balancing of the utilities 
could be performed at the liability stage of litigation was far from a new concept in Eng-
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judgment for monetary damages, the proprietor of the estate learned 
that the copper smelter had plans on expanding its operations.176 He 
sought relief in equity, and he was found to be "entitled ... to an in-
junction to protect his rights which had been thus ascertained at 
law. "177 This result indicates that the balancing of the utilities doctrine 
was first seen by the English courts as a new equitable doctrine used 
for the determination of the liability or the rights of the parties, not 
for the determination of the need for a remedy to protect those 
rights. 178 The amount of discretion that such a utilitarian doctrine 
could offer, however, may have made it attractive to a judge sitting as 
chancellor searching for a fair resolution to a dispute. 
Eventually the balancing of the utilities doctrine found its way 
into the remedy stage of litigation in cases where a common law nui-
sance was actually found to exist. 179 In 1868, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, in the A.ppeal of Richal'(is, was the first American court to 
uphold the denial of an injunction in the face of a proven nuisance.180 
The case involved an owner of a cotton factory who wanted to enjoin 
an owner of an ironworks from burning coal because of the damage 
from the emitted noxious fumes. 181 The lower court, reasoning along 
the lines of the actual holding of St. Helen's Smelting, did not find a 
nuisance to exist due to the questionable and de minimus nature of 
the plaintiff's damages.182 On appeal the plaintiff cited St. Helen's 
Smelting for the proposition that the defendant had no right to pollute 
land. As early as 1606, in the Rankctts Case, the Court of the King's Bench noted that it 
would not find a nuisance where society's need for an alleged nuisance excused it. Ran-
ketts Case (KB. 1606), reported ill 2 H. ROLLE, ROLLE'S ABRIDGMENT 139 (1668) ("Si home 
fait Calldclls deins un Vill, per que il calise U1/ l/oyS011t Sellt alInhabitallts, 1IIIcore cco nest ascull 
Nusans, car Ie needfillness de eux dispel/sera ove Ie 1l0iS011tlleSS del smell."). 
176 BISPHAM, supra note 81, at 555 (5th ed. 1893). 
177 Id. at 555-56. 
178 See id.; Coquillette, supra note 160, at 782-91. 
179 HOFFER, supra note 40, at 153. In regard to public nuisances, the historical devel-
opment of equitable principles goes back at least to the reign of Queen Elizabeth. 1 STORY, 
supra note 52, at 201. 
180 See 57 Pa. 105,105 (1868); HOFFER, supra note 40, at 152. Although courts asserted 
that discretion was the hallmark of equity, up until the 1860s an injunction regularly issued 
upon the finding of a nuisance. 1 S'IDRY, supra note 52, at 152. Some concerns included 
the concept that "the crown cannot sanction a nuisance" and that to do so on the behalf of 
private parties would effectuate a right of private eminent domain. See Boomer v. Atl. Ce-
ment Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 876 (N.Y 1970) (Jasen.]., dissenting); 1 STORY, supra note 52, 
at 202. 
181 See Appeal of Richards, 57 Pa. at 105. 
182/d. 
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so as to have a detrimental effect on neighboring property.183 The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, agreed that there was a nui-
sance, but denied an injunction after balancing the utilities in the 
remedy stage of the litigation, stating: "[C]oal, we think ... is neces-
sary in the manufacture of iron, such as the business of the defen-
dants require, and whose fabrics the public require."184 
2. Reaction to Equity's Formalism 
Modern courts have accepted the balancing of the utilities doc-
trine and have extended it beyond common law nuisance actions to 
cases involving violations of statutes and regulations. l85 This doctrine 
allows for greater judicial discretion in the remedy stage of litigation, 
as opposed to the liability stage that is guided by well-settled equitable 
doctrines. It appears to be a reaction to the reduced discretion in the 
liability stage found in equity jurisprudence. 186 
The infusion of discretion into the remedy stage of litigation by 
the balancing of the utilities doctrine would appear to have injected 
the concept of the court's conscience into the remedy stage, a prob-
lem of possible unbounded discretion akin to that experienced and 
criticized when equity was in its youth. 187 As equity originally sough t to 
alleviate the rigors of the common law, this balancing approach acts as 
a check to prevent abuse of the rigors of the settled equitable doc-
trines by plaintiffs. l88 One state intermediate appellate court acknowl-
edged the prophylactic nature of this doctrine stating: 
HIS Id. 
184 Id. Possibly the most famous American nuisance case, decided on similar lines. is 
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., where the air pollution associated with a cement factory was 
determined to be a nuisance but was allowed to continue provided that the cement com-
pany pay existing and estimated permanent damages to neighboring property owners. 257 
N.E.2d at 874-75. Here the court balanced the amount of harm to the cement factory 
owner and the public interest if the injunction issued, to the harm to the plaintiffs if the 
injunction did not issue-Oscar Boomer, the named plaintiff, was complaining of cement 
dust damage to his junkyard. Telephone Interview with Oscar Boomer (Sept. 2001). Mr. 
Boomer stated that the cement factory is still polluting to this day; he believes that the trial 
court judge did not care for junkyards that much. Id. 
185 See United States v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1329, 1358-59 (5th Cir. 1996); 
United StateS\'. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 736 (3d Cir. 1993); United States Envtl. Prot. Agency 
v. Envtl. Waste Control. Inc .. 917 F.2d 327, 332 (7th Cir. 1990); Guam Scottish Rite Bodies 
v. Flores. 486 F.2d 748. 749 (9th Cir. 1990); Gilbert v. Repertory, Inc., 18 N.E.2d 437, 439 
(Mass. 1939); Stewart v. Finkelstone, 92 N.E. 37, 38 (Mass. 1910). 
186 See Miller v. City of West Carrollton, 632 N.E.2d 582, 587 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); su-
pra Part I.C. 
187 See supra notes 102-114 and accompanying text. 
188 .'vIiller, 632 N.E.2d at 587. 
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This [balancing of the utilities] is ... the judicial recognition 
of a circumstance in which one party uses a legal right to 
gain purchase of an equitable club to be used as a weapon of 
oppression rather than in defense of a right. It is a contra-
diction of terms to adhere to a rule which requires a court of 
equity to act oppressively or inequitably and by rote rather 
than through reason.189 
If this is true, is it also true that this newfound discretion in the 
remedy stage can reject the underlying goals of equity jurisprudence 
or the long established equitable canons and doctrines? Further study 
into the nature of the balancing of the utilities should remember the 
admonition of then-Chief Justice Cardozo of the New York Court of 
Appeals: "In the award of equitable remedies there is often an ele-
ment of discretion, but never a discretion that is absolute or arbitrary. 
In equity, as at law, there are signposts for the traveler. 'Discretion ... 
must be regulated upon grounds that will make it judicial. "'190 
III. BALANCING OF THE UTILITIES AND SUNK COSTS 
Since the introduction of the balancing of the utilities doctrine, 
what does a court of equity do when it has been determined that a 
defendant has violated a statute? What is balanced? What of sunk 
costs? What "signposts" are there to help guide the judge through her 
or his decisionmaking? 
It appears that the contours of the balancing of the utilities doc-
trine result from the nurturing of a historic equitable canon, "where 
the equity is equal, the law must prevail" (the Canon), which was ap-
plied in the remedy stage of litigation. The Canon is concerned with 
the "innocence" of a party's action and the diligence of the parties.19l 
It seems that it would embrace the balancing of the utilities doctrine, 
whereas it notes that the equities, and the utilities, of the parties are 
capable of being unequaI.I92 This proposition, however, ignores the 
fact that the Canon is concerned with the innocence of the parties' ac-
189Id. 
190 E\'angelical Lutheran Church of the Ascension v. Sahlem, 172 N,E. 455, 457 (N.Y 
1930) (quoting Haberman v. Baker, 28 N.E. 370. 370 (N.Y 1891) (quoting Lord Chancel-
lor Eldon». 
191 See HOFFER, supra note 40, at 10-11 (quoting RICHARD FRANCIS, MAXIMS OF EQUITY 
iii-iv (1726». 
192Id. 
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tions and the diligence in prosecution of the parties.193 Describing the 
policies underl}ing this canon, Joseph Story writes, "Equity is equal 
between persons, who have been equally innocent, and equally dili-
gent. "194 
It may be helpful to look at the application of the Canon to dis-
putes concerning private actors. As will be shown, by using the balanc-
ing of the utilities doctrine, a private defendant may not seek shelter 
from the court's power of injunctive relief if the defendant has will-
fully and knowingly proceeded in violation of private law.195 Courts, 
implicitly incorporating the Canon into the remedy stage of litigation, 
have also accepted this reasoning where it comes to willful and know-
ing violations of public law by private parties.196 This reasoning should 
sound the death knell for any advantage in the balancing of the utili-
ties that a private defendant may seek from an aggressive sunk costs 
strategy, provided that the plaintiff has not run afoul of any of the 
other settled canons or maxims of equity.197 
A. Willful and Knowing Violations in Suits Involving 
Private Parties and Plivate Law 
Once a violation of a law is found in litigation between private 
parties, then a court will proceed to fashion a remedy. The balancing 
of the equities is not performed where a private defendant willfully 
and knowingly violates private law-for example, easements and 
covenants.19B "The benefit of the doctrine of balancing the equities 
... is reserved for the innocent defendant. "199 When the defendant's 
193 SeeJOHN ADAMS, DOCTRINE OF EQUITY *148, *159; F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY 327-28 
(A.H. Chaytor & WJ. Whittaker eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1936) (1909); 1 STORY, supra 
note 52, at 75. 
194 1 STORY, supra note 52, at 75; see also MAITLAND, supra note 193, at 326. 
195 Sec United States v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1329, 1358-59 (5th Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719. 736 (3d Cir. 1993); United States Envtl. Prot. Agency 
v. Em·t!. Waste Control, Inc., 917 F.2d 327, 332 (7th Cir. 1990); Guam Scottish Rite Bodies 
v. Flores, 486 F.2d 748. 749 (9th Cir. 1990). 
196 See infra Part III. 
197 See id. In a powerful statement of the limited powers of equity when facing a viola-
tion of a statute. John SeIden observes that if it is determined that a defendant has violated 
a statute. then the judge sitting in equity is robbed of a large degree of discretion and 
"must doe by him as they have pubJickly agreed" because both the judge and the defen-
dant have consented to the law. SELDEN, supra note 106. at 43-44. Selden is actually refer-
ring to a criminal statute with a violation resulting in the death penalty. Id. 
198 See Marine Shale Pmcessors. 81 F.3d at 1358-59; Pozsgai. 999 F.2d at 736; Envtl. Waste 
Contm/, 917 F.2d at 332; Guam Scottish Rite Bodies, 486 F.2d at 749. 
199 Papanikolas Bros. Enters. v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256, 1259 
(Utah 1975) (emphasis added). 
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violation is deliberate, and is a willful and intentional act, equity may 
require that an injunction issue. In such a circumstance, no attention 
is paid to the "relative inconveniences or hardships that may result" 
from the granting of an injunction, because a willful and knowing vio-
lation of a law can hardly be termed "innocent. "200 vVithout allowing 
the counterbalance of the defendant's sunk costs, the plaintiff prevails 
and an injunction will issue.201 The public interest concerns in this 
category of cases are usually not raised, because violations of private 
law usually do not impact the public interest.202 
Without the advan tage of the sunk costs in the balancing of the 
utilities, judicial results have been unapologetically harsh to the de-
fendant, often requiring complete removal of structures or the resto-
ration of property.203 The Canon circumscribing the inherent discre-
tion of the balancing of the utilities doctrine has taken form in a 
series of cases where a defendant willfully and knowingly built struc-
tures that encroached onto a neighboring property,204 frustrated an 
easement,205 or violated a covenant on a deed.206 
In a case often cited to illustrate the application of the Canon, 
StewaTt v. Finkelstone, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court up-
held an injunction requiring the removal of a completed building 
constructed by the defendant in willful and knowing violation of a 
deed restriction addressing the character and extent of structures on 
the property.207 The court admonished the defendant's action, stating 
that it was a deliberate attempt to override the restriction.208 In up-
holding the injunction, the court acknowledged that its result was 
drastic, but that "it ought not be withheld merely for the reason that it 
will cause pecuniary loss."209 The defendant "took his chances with 
200 See id.; M.T. Van Heeke, Injunctions to Remove or Remodel Structures Erected ill l'iolatioll 
of Building Restlictions, 32 TEx. L. REV. 521, 524 (1954). 
201 See Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d at 1359; 5 POMEROY, supra note 81, at 4362-64. 
202 See Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 550-52 (1937). 
203 Papanikolas Bros. Enters., 535 P.2d at 1259; see Gilbert v. Repertory, Inc., 18 N.E.2d 
437, 439 (Mass. 1939); Stewart v. Finkelstone, 92 N .E. 37, 38 (l\Iass. 1910). 
204 See, e.g., Curtis Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Wire Co., 89 N.E. 534, 535 (Mass. 1909); Kratze 
v. Indep. Order of Odd fellows, Garden City Lodge No. 11,500 N.'V.2d 115, 120-21 (Mich. 
1993). 
205 See, e.g., Gilbert, 18 N.E.2d at 439. 
206 See, e.g., N.H. Donuts, Inc. v. Skipitaris, 533 A.2d 351, 357 (N.H. 1987); Papallikolas 
Bros. Enters., 535 P.2d at 1259. 
207 92 N.E. at 34-35. 
208 See id. 
209 Id. at 38. 
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eyes open to the results that might ensue."210 The court went on to 
state, in one of the most cited comments in this area of law, "En-
trenchment behind considerable expenditures of money cannot 
shield premeditated efforts to evade or circumscribe legal obligations 
from the salutary remedies of equity. "211 
The plaintiff's rights will be enforced irrespective of the degree 
of actual property or monetary damage that the plain tiff would suffer 
if the private law creating the right were not enforced.212 Relief is not 
withheld because the damage to the plaintiff is unsubstantial or even 
nonexistent. 213 "[I] t is not a question of damage, but the mere cir-
cumstance of the breach of [a private law right] affords sufficient 
ground for the Court to in terfere by injunction. "214 
In Professor Van Hecke's survey of injunctions that were issued 
or denied concerning the removal or remodeling of structures 
erected in violation of the law, he noted that the courts "unanimously 
refused to put relative hardship into the reckoning in cases where the 
defendan t had acted willfully ... and the hardship likely to result to 
the defendant if [an] injunction were granted was of his own mak-
ing. "215 As between two private parties in a dispute concerning private 
law, the defendant is not allowed to offer a counterweight in this equi-
table balance.216 
B. Willful and Knowing Violations in Suits Involving 
Private Parties and Public Law 
As equity jurisprudence evolved, the Canon was applied to facts 
invohing the grant of an injunction where a private party defendant 
willfully and knowingly violated a public law.217 This is true for viola-
tions involving public law such as federal statutes218 or local zoning 
210 [d. 
211 [d. 
212 See Eyangelical Lutheran Church of the Ascension y. Sahlem, 172 N.E. 455, 457 
(N.Y 1930). 
213 Sec id.; Trs. of Columbia ColI. v. Thacher, 87 N.Y 311, 316 (1881); Manners v. John-
son, [1875-76] 1 Ch, D. 673, 680 (1875) (quoting Tipping v. Eckersley, 69 Eng. Rep. 779, 
782 (Ch. 1855)). 
214 Trs. of Columbia Coli., 87 N.Y at 316 (quoting Tipping, 69 Eng. Rep. at 782). 
215 Van Heeke, supra note 200, at 530. 
216 See id. 
217 See United States v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1329, 1359 (5th Cir. 1996). 
218 See id. (suggesting the application of the innocence of action factor, absent a clear 
restriction on the court's jurisdiction from Congress, to violations of the Clean Water Act, 
the Clean Air Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); Hill II, 549 F.2d 
1064,1071 (6th Cir. 1977), afi'd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (implicitly applying the exception to 
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ordinances.219 These cases hardly mention the public interest for it is 
presumed that the legislative mandate indicates where the public in-
terest lies. 
In the case of McCavic v. DeLuca, a court was forced to grapple 
with a willful and intentional violation of a city zoning ordinance that 
dictated the existence of a fifteen-foot setback line on a 10t.220 The 
court, citing the private law case of StC"llJaTl v. Finkelstone,221 applied the 
Canon to a public law and private actor context. It denied the possible 
protection of balancing, where the sunk costs surely would have tilted 
in the defendant's favor, because the offending structure was, in fact, 
completed.222 The court upheld an injunction ordering the removal 
of the portion of the building-a considerable portion that was seven 
feet over the setback line.223 In doing so the court noted: "If there is 
any hardship caused by the enforcement of the ordinance, it has been 
brought about entirely by defendant's stubborn insistence upon pro-
ceeding, in violation of the ordinance .... "224 
In United States v. Mmine Shale Processors,225 the Fifth Circuit, con-
sidering the Canon as an exception to the balancing of the utilities doc-
trine, affirmed the issuance of an injunction. This was due to the dis-
trict court's finding that the defendant willfully and voluntarily 
violated the Clean Air Act; this effectively foreclosed the use of equi-
table balancing to the defendant.226 
IV. EXTENDING THE EQUITABLE CANON OF INNOCENCE AND 
DILIGENCE TO AGENCIES AND THE PUBLIC LAW: 
A GUIDE FORJUDGES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGANTS 
Although this Canon appears readily applicable to most scenarios 
involving willful and voluntary violations of some form of public or 
private law, courts appear to be hesitant to ignore the amount of pub-
lic money that has already been spent when the willful and voluntary 
the Endangered Species Act). This exception has also been applied to intellectual prop-
erty cases. Almine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d at 1359 n.16. 
219 See generally Morgan v. Veach, 139 P.2d 976 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943); Cooke v. 
Taube, 125 N.W.2d 278 (Mich. 1963); McCavic v. DeLuca, 46 N.W.2d 873 (Minn. 1951). 
220 McCavic, 46 N.W.2d at 875. 
221 Id. at 878. 
222 See id. at 874. 
223 See id. at 874, 878. 
224 !d. at 877. 
225 81 F.3d 1329 (5th Cir. 1996). 
226Id. at 1358-60. 
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violator is a government actor. 227 In this scenario, the balancing of the 
utilities between the parties appears to be nonsensical and is not per-
formed. 228 Thus, the judicial determination is reduced to a balancing 
of public interests229: the public interest in the government agency 
spending public money in violation of the law, and the public interest 
in having the government act according to the law.230 
A. Extension to an Agency's Willful and Knowing Violation of a Public Law 
In the TIil v. Hill litigation, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
insisted that economic expenditures and realities of the 1VA's Tellico 
Dam project23! did not grant it a license to rewrite a statute and allow 
a government agency to operate counter to a statute, no matter how 
desirable the agency's project may have appeared.232 The Sixth Circuit 
decided that it was an abuse of discretion on the part of the district 
court not to issue an injunction, and that the court could not allow a 
clear violation of federal law to continue.233 The court refused the in-
227 See generally Hill III, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Hill II. 549 F.2d 1064, 1074 (6th Cir. 1977), 
afld, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Hill L 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). rev'd, 549 F.2d 1064 
(6th Cir. 1977), afld, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
228 See Seattle Audubon Soc 'y Y. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1096 (D. Wash. 1991). 
229 See id. 
230 See id. Although beyond the immediate scope of this Note, one could argue that the 
public interest in having the government obey the law would outweigh any counterbal-
ance. It has been suggested that in cases involYing public health and environmentallegisla-
tion, there is a strong presumption that the public health emphasis creates a countervail-
ing public interest that must be taken into account in the equitable calculus. See Cooper v. 
Aaron, 358 U.S.!. 23 (1958) (quoting MASS. CONST. pmbl., pt. I, art. 30) ("a government 
of laws and not of men"); Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. Jacoby, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1245 
(D. Or. 1998); 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, BRACTON ON TIlE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 
33 (George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (1220) 
("The king must not be under man but under God and under the law, because law makes 
the king."); GRATIAN, supra note 89, at 29 ("It is just that the prince be restrained by his 
own ordinances .... That princes are bound by their own enactments in itself prohibits 
them from infringing the ordinances they have imposed on their own subjects."); JOHN 
LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 199-201,202 ("Where-ever law ends, tyr-
anny begins ... . "), 203-209, rcprintcd in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1690); JEAN-
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY pt. I, at 118 (1755) ("[T]he first 
rule of the public economy is that the administration should be in conformity with the 
laws."), repJinted in JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU: THE BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS (Donald A. 
Cress trans. & ed., 1987); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON TIlE SOCIAL CONTRACT bk. III, 
ch, X, at 193 (1762), reP/lllted ill JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU: THE BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS 
(Donald A. Cress trans. & ed., 1987). 
231 See the account of these expenditures in the Introduction. 
232 Hill II, 549 F.2d at 1074 (citing W. Va. Div. of Izaak Walton League v. Butz, 522 F.2d 
945, 955 (4th Cir. 1975». 
233 See id. at 1074-75; SAX, supra note 33, at 175-92. 
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vitation to "legislate" an exemption to the ESA for the Tellico Dam, 
and it directed the district court to issue a permanent injunction ar-
resting all activities incident to the Tellico Dam project.234 The court 
additionally stated: "This injunction shall remain in effect until Con-
gress, by appropriate legislation, exempts Tellico from compliance 
with the Act or the snail darter has been deleted from the list of en-
dangered species or its critical habitat materially redefined. "235 
The Sixth Circuit, believing that it could not engage in a balanc-
ing of the utilities after finding a statutory violation, may have as-
sumed that if it were allowed naked discretion under the balancing of 
the utilities doctrine, the analysis of the utilities concerning the Tel-
lico Dam project may favor the denial of injunctive relief.236 In recog-
nition of the Canon, the court added that the character of the defen-
dant's action could have been considered.237 
When the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Cir-
ClIit'S decision, it did so on different grounds.238 The Court clung to 
the explicit language of the ESA, holding that it stripped the court of 
its traditional discretion, which it otherwise would exercise when de-
ciding to grant an injunction.239 The Court also insisted that where a 
court's equity jurisdiction is not circumscribed by the legislature, equi-
table remedies, including injunctions, are discretionary240-reasoning 
contrary to the implication of the Sixth Circuit's ruling that there is 
no discretion when a court faces a clear statutory violation.241 In so 
doing, the Supreme Court implied that the decision to issue an in-
junction would otherwise be subject to traditional equitable concerns 
and judicial discretion, but the Court did not imply that this discretion 
was completely unbridled. 242 
Taken together, the opinions of the Sixth Circuit and the Su-
preme Court outline the analysis required where a government 
agency has willfully and knowingly violated a statute, and is attempt-
ing to use a sunk costs strategy to influence any balancing that a court 
may undertake.243 After deciding that a statute has been violated, a 
234 See SAX, supra note 33, at 175-92. 
235 Hill II, 549 F.2d at 1075. 
236 Id. at 1074. 
237 See id. But see INTRODUCTION for a discussion on TVA's actions and expenditures. 
238 See Hill III, 437 V.S. 153, 193-95 (1978). 
239Id. 
240 See id.; Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 V.S. 321, 329 (1944). 
241 See Hill II, 549 F.2d at lO74-75. 
242 See Hill III, 437 V.S. at 193-95; SELDEN, supra note lO6, at 43. 
243 See Hill Ill, 437 V.S. at 193-95; Hi/Ill, 549 F.2d at 1074-75. 
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court must determine whether the statute leaves the court with any 
discretion in fashioning a remedy, or whether the statute requires or 
precludes an injunctive remedy.244 Next, the balancing of the utilities 
is performed subject to the Canon-a court's consideration of the 
character of the defendant's action.245 
Thus, where a government agency has acted willfully and know-
ingly, expending funds in furtherance of a statutory violation, those 
funds are subject to the same treatment as situations involving private 
party defendants; a court will exclude such funds from its calculus.246 
If the court is to adopt the Greek, Roman, and High Court of Chan-
cery yision of equity as a measure of fairness to be used "to defend the 
law from crafty evasions, delusions, and mere subtleties, invented and 
contrived to evade and elude the Common Law, whereby sHch as have 
undoubted right are made remediless, "247 then it is reasonable that 
the Canon be explicitly extended to govern the balancing of the utili-
ties doctrine, in the form of an exception or otherwise. But, how does 
a judge decide when an agency's violation is willful and knowing? 
B. The Tligger: When Is an Agelll), Violation of the Public Law Willful and 
Knowing? 
To decide at what point a government agency's actions become a 
willful and knowing violation of a statute, it is helpful to discern the 
rationale behind the triggering mechanisms used for this determina-
tion in the parent body of law-litigation involving only private par-
ties. In private party litigation, the finding of a defendant's willful and 
knowing violation of a private or public law turns on the existence of 
the defendant's actual or constructive knowledge of the violation.248 
The most common examples include the defendant's actual or con-
structive knowledge of restrictions on his or her deed,249 protests by 
private persons who had standing to enforce sHch restrictions,25o pro-
244 Sec Hill III, 437 U.S. at 193-95; see also Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 
313 (1982). 
245 Hill IL 549 F.2d at 1074. 
246 See id.; see also supra Part I.D.2-.3. 
247 Sec 1 STORY, supra note 52. at 18-19 (quoting Dudley v. Dudley. 24 Eng. Rep. 118, 
119 (Ch. 1705)). 
248 SceVan Heeke. sllpra note 200, at 530. 
249 Sec, e.g., Stewart v. Finkelstone. 92 N.E. 37 (Mass. 1910); Van Heeke, supra note 200, 
at 530 n.96. 
250 Sec, e.g., Curtis Mfg. Co. y. Spencer Wire Co .. 89 N.E. 534 (Mass. 1909); Van Heeke, 
supra note 200, at 530 n.97. 
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tests by government officials,251 threats of lawsuits,252 or the actual 
bringing of a suit.253 
Once the willful and knowing nature of the defendant's action is 
found, none of these cases draws a bright line between the legitimate 
sunk costs expended by accident or innocent mistake, and the costs 
that were incurred in furtherance of a possible violation.254 Such a 
distinction is unnecessary because landowners are unlikely to be 
caught in mid-construction by a new private law covenant without at 
least constructive knowledge of its existence. It is also unlikely that a 
landowner would face the consequences of a sudden downzoning of 
her or his property if the construction had already been issued a 
building permit.255 This is true for the permitting of other private 
party activities as well.256 
The application of the Canon, which some courts label the willful 
and knowing exception, to the balancing of the equities doctrine did 
not need to accommodate scenarios in which a defendant actively, 
willfully, and knowingly violated a private or public law enacted mid-
construction.257 This is especially true where legislation is passed at 
some point in time after the defendant government agency begins a 
251 See. e.g .• McCavic v. DeLuca, 46 N.W.2d 873 (Minn. 1951); Van Hecke, supra note 
200, at 530 n.97. 
252 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Repertory, Inc., 18 N.E.2d 437 (l\lass. 1939); Van Hecke, supra 
note 200, at 530 n.97. 
253 See, e.g., Morgan v. Veach, 139 P.2d 976 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943); Van Hecke, supra 
note 200, at 530 n.98. 
254 See notes 200-216 and accompanying text. 
255 Procedural due process concerns would require more of a municipality or town-at 
least notice of the proposed regulation-before it could be applied to its inhabitants by 
holding them responsible for compliance. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XN, § 1. As a side 
note, the issue of a building permit is raised so that the difference between states where 
development rights become vested late (after the issuance of a building permit), early 
(after the submission of a preliminary plan), or somewhere in between, does not have to 
be further clarified and its implications dealt with in this Note. See generally Avco Cmty. 
Developers, Inc. v. S. Coast Reg'l Comm'n, 553 P.2d 546 (Cal. 1976) (the leading case on 
late vesting development rights); W. Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 
(Utah 1980) (providing a general discussion on early vesting, late vesting, and intermedi-
ate "balancing test" vesting development rights); Brad K. Schwartz, Develop11lent A.greelllents: 
Contracting for Vested Rights, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 719 (2001) (offering a discllssion 
on the principles of vested rights and the need for development agreements in some 
states). 
256 See note 185 and accompanying text. 
257 See supra Part I.D.2-.3. 
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project.258 A sorting out and a separate accounting of such pre- and 
post-notification expenses are necessary.259 
In such cases, a judge could apply the indicators that courts use 
when evaluating whether private conduct is willful and knowing.260 
But, in the special case of an agency-defendant, it is established that 
such a defendant must comply with both the most current state of 
statutory law, including the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) ,261 
with an eye to the demands of traditional equity jurisprudence. One 
of the tenets of equity jurisprudence holds: "There is an equity to 
keep [government agencies] within the strict limits of their statutory 
powers, and prevent them from deviating in the smallest degree from 
the terms prescribed by the statute which gives them authority. "262 As 
traditional equity jurisprudence pertains to the specific case of TVA's 
Tellico Dam, it has been observed that government agencies that 
"have the power to take land and construct public works are not ame-
nable to the jurisdiction of a court of equity if they keep within the 
line of their powers. .. [but] if they exceed their authority ... the 
courts will interfere. "263 Because government agencies have a duty to 
comply with the current state of applicable laws-unless otherwise 
granted a statutory exemption-the court must hold such agencies to 
a high standard when discerning their willful and knowing actions.264 
The duty to comply with a statute may be said to begin when the 
agency gains actual knowledge of its violative conduct, or with some 
other form of notification, either from another governmental entity, 
or from a private party. However, the duty to comply apparently be-
gins with the enactment of the statute that the agency is actively violat-
ing.265 As in cases involving private parties, a court must find a willful 
and knowing violation of a statute and ignore the money expended in 
an agency's sunk costs strategy.266 Non-recoverable expenditures that 
were incurred before the enactment of the statute may surely enter 
258 See Hill III, 437 U.S. 153. 193 (1978). 
259 See id. 
260 See notes 248-253 and accompanying text. 
261 See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U .S.C. § 706(A) (1996). 
262 BISPHAM, supra note 81, at 355 (11th ed. 1931). 
263 Id. at 361-62. 
264 !d. 
265 See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946,P !3~'5 706f~) /( 1,9fl6); BISPHAM, supra 
note81,at361-62,376-77 (l1thed.1931). ; U 
266 Sec BrsPHAM, supra note 81, at 376-77 (lIth ed. 1931). 
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into the balance of the utilities.267 If this is true, then a court may also 
look to the other deceptive behavior surrounding an agency project-
sudden increases in expenditures as a lawsuit is looming-and use 
these actions, according to the Canon, to discount such expenditures 
and remove the sunk costs weapon from an agency's arsenal. 
CONCLUSION 
The sunk costs strategy of government agencies has the potential 
to cripple the enforcement of environmental statutes and regulations. 
If agencies are allowed to spend money in furtherance of their statu-
tory violations, and count those expenditures in the balancing of the 
utilities doctrine, then they are rewarded for their illegal efforts, and 
government may be able to avoid accountability, and worse, avoid its 
own laws. 
From its beginning, equity has been concerned about the fairness 
of a dispute's resolution, by taking into account the particular circum-
stances of the dispute. Equity has also addressed the protection of 
rights as determined by the court; however, this basic principle of eq-
uity has been tempered by the injection of seemingly wild discretion 
into the remedy stage of litigation through the adoption of the bal-
ancing of the utilities. Although it is a fairly new doctrine, judges sit-
ting in equity have, either implicitly or explicitly, carried over other 
principles of equity, namely the canon stating that, "where the equity 
is equal, the law must prevail." This canon, dealing with the inno-
cence of the parties' actions, guides judges and prevents what an oth-
erwise naked pro forma, cost-benefit analysis may yield alone. In pri-
vate litigation, courts look to the innocence of the parties' actions; 
determine that a willful and knowing violation of the law is not inno-
cent; and have refused to allow the defendant's money spent in fur-
therance of the violation to be weighed in any equitable balance. 
This logic should be extended to the actions of government 
agencies as well, whether termed as an exception to the balancing of 
the utilities doctrine, or stated as the canon itself. Then, when con-
fronted with the uncomfortable position of deciding whether to issue 
an injunction to stop construction on a multi-million dollar public 
works project a court can simply state, "In balancing the utilities, we 
refuse to assign any weight to the money that the Executive Branch 
has spen t in furtherance of its willful statutory violation. " 
267 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(A); Hillll, 549 F.2d 1064. 1074 (6th Cir. 1977). a/I'd, 437 U.S. 153 
(1978); BISPHAM. supra note 81. at 361-62.376-77 (11th ed. 1931). 
